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It is both a great honor and sad duty to deliver the Keynote Address at 
the Bernard Siegan Memorial Conference on Economic Liberties, Property 
Rights, and the Original Meaning of the Constitution.  It is, I think, not 
inappropriate to start with a few words of praise for Bernie both as a 
human being and as an influential scholar.  I am pleased to say that 
Bernie received his law degree from the University of Chicago in 1949, 
after which he formed a law firm in Chicago with his lifelong friend, 
Herb Karlan.  That firm specialized in land use issues and gave both 
Bernie and Herb a close-up view of how the system of land use 
regulation worked in one of the major urban centers in the United States.  
After they had been in business for many years, both Bernie and Herb 
developed a strong academic itch, which led them to liquidate their firm 
in order to enter the academy, with Herb going to Southwestern Law 
School and Bernie coming to the University of San Diego.  What is 
remarkable about this venture was that Bernie did not enter the academic 
lists until he was close to fifty years of age.  Notwithstanding his late 
start, Bernie quickly became a star as a result of his writings on the areas 
he knew so well: land use planning and economic liberties.  Through his 
two best-known books, Land Use Without Zoning1 and Economic Liberties 
and the Constitution,2 Bernie opened a productive dialogue in areas in 
which the dominance of state power had long been unquestioned.3 
Bernie’s style of argumentation was more intuitive than technical.  
Bernie could not quite understand why the legislature should want, or be 
allowed, to interfere with the ordinary use of land rights, or to tell people 
that they could not engage in honest occupations without the prior 
approval of the state.  To him, the defense of individual liberty was 
indeed a perfectly self-evident proposition, while the manifold schemes 
of regulation imposed upon it that limited its exercise were anything but.  
I can still vividly recall a conference on Economic Liberties and Property 
Rights that was held at the University of San Diego School of Law in 
early December 1983, where Bernie went to great lengths to present his 
own views.  The tension between him and one of his major intellectual 
adversaries, Robert Bork, was quite evident.  Bork’s major theme was 
that constitutional law must be understood in light of its central objective 
to protect legislative and democratic institutions from constant oversight 
and nullification by unelected judges.  At one point, he was driven to say 
 
 1. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972). 
 2. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 
2006).  The distinctive break from the past came with the publication of the first edition 
of this book in 1980. 
 3. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) 
(upholding zoning); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–36 (1954) (upholding broad 
powers of condemnation). 
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that courts should sustain any legislation that a government lawyer can 
defend with a straight face, even though he knew that the underlying 
arguments advanced in favor of that statute were false.  That vivid 
formulation is not far removed from the dominant “rational basis” test 
that dominates so much of modern constitutional discourse: sustain a 
statute that has any tenuous connection to any conceivable social end.  
Bernie, of course, did not quite see matters in that fashion.  For him, the 
courts were there to protect individuals from domination by political 
institutions that often showed scant respect for individual rights.  Bernie 
was no doctrinaire libertarian.  He only thought that the state should 
have to present justifications for regulation that were commensurate with 
the important property rights and economic liberties that it sought to 
abridge.  For Bernie, this insight stemmed both from his extraordinary 
sense of personal decency and his deep knowledge of our constitutional 
history.  To him, the Constitution was not an empty vessel into which 
scholars could pour whatever political vision they accepted.  Its basic 
contours speak of the protection of private property and of contract.  
Although the Founders did not subscribe fully and uniformly to the 
classical liberal vision of limited government and strong property rights, 
those two phrases taken together offer the best guidance to our basic 
constitutional direction, at least in the absence of more specific textual or 
historical guidance. 
My task in this essay is to show the wisdom of the Siegan position by 
stressing what happens when courts decide systematically to ignore it in 
favor of a constitutional view that is far closer to that of Robert Bork 
insofar as it gives the legislature free reign over both economic liberties 
and property rights.  I cannot do this with respect to the full range of 
issues that crop up under these two capacious heads.  But it is possible to 
show how a wide range of unsound judicial decisions have created a 
perfect storm in land use regulation that has done much to harm the 
vitality of land development in the United States.  Part I of this essay 
identifies the confluence of factors that leads to the creation of this 
perfect storm.  Part II then examines the key elements of the basic 
mixture, covering those which make private development more costly 
and those which reduce the cost of using the eminent domain power.  
Part III then looks at five recent decisions that illustrate how these 
elements work together in actual cases.  Part IV concludes with a brief 
discussion of the connection between these modern developments and 
the inquiry into the original meaning of the Constitution. 
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I.  WHY THE PERFECT STORM  
It is instructive at the outset to explain why I have chosen to address 
this topic through the use of the term The Perfect Storm, the title of a 
well-known nonfiction book by Sebastian Junger that offers a riveting 
account of the 1991 Halloween Nor’easter which resulted in the sinking 
of the fishing boat Andrea Gail 575 miles out to sea in the North 
Atlantic with the loss of its crew.4  That title brings to the fore the notion 
that devastating storms typically take place only with the confluence of 
multiple factors, each of which ordinarily has a low probability of 
occurrence.  The key insight is that the combination of factors has a 
synergistic effect, here negative, whose combined force is greater than 
the simple sum of the constituent forces, each taken in isolation of each 
other. 
The Perfect Storm offers an instructive metaphor in dealing with the 
law of takings.  There is much to be said in praise of incremental 
decisionmaking that treats each case on its own merits.  Small steps 
often mean that judges make fewer mistakes than they would if they 
sought to develop some grand theory on the basis of a limited set of facts 
drawn from a particular case.  But there are also serious difficulties 
associated with that cautious approach precisely because it ignores the 
synergistic effects that arise from the interplay of different doctrines on 
the same set of social institutions and practices.  Judges should be aware 
of these effects because their decisions rarely take place on a blank slate.  
Rather, all decisions in well-traveled areas are made against a context 
that includes adjacent doctrines, so that simple prudence asks judges to 
take account of how they interact.  I believe that this is especially true in 
land use cases where all the pressure on procedural and substantive 
issues is used to give land use planning officials at all levels of 
government the maximum level of discretion in how they proceed.  The 
pervasive influence of political factions allows these combined powers 
to be misused in many settings, yet there are virtually no tools in the 
landowner’s litigation toolkit that offer strong resistance to them. 
Is there still not a risk of judicial usurpation of the democratic 
process?  I think that this risk is ever present, especially in cases when 
courts require state legislatures to tax and spend.  But, in connection 
with the multiple forms of state regulation, it is generally overstated.  A 
more alert and vigilant judiciary that scrutinized legislation need not run 
the risk of becoming a super legislature if it observes the usual limitations 
on judicial power that are routinely respected in other areas where courts 
bring higher levels of scrutiny to all manner of political decisions. 
 
 4. SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM 37, 135, 146 (1997). 
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Here are two examples: The greatness of our First Amendment law 
does not rest on the supine judicial position that all speech may be 
suppressed so long as there is some conceivable benefit that could result 
from its suppression.  Rather, we have a set of rules that protect speech 
in accordance with the principles of limited government.  The state can 
counter defamation and fraud; it can impose antitrust restrictions on 
newspapers and the like; it can stop various forms of child pornography 
and perhaps even obscenity.  Go down the list and it is clear that 
virtually every sensible form of speech regulation is permissible under a 
First Amendment approach that is consciously informed by the classical 
liberal orientation.  And where the First Amendment cases go off the 
rails, as they surely do in the campaign finance cases,5 it is because they 
indulge wrongly in the good government assumption of the Progressive 
mindset that finds some ostensible public interest rationale for legislation 
that tends, inevitably, to skew political power to the haves—the incumbents— 
from the have nots—the challengers. 
The same basic mindset applies with respect to the dormant Commerce 
Clause.  Notwithstanding its somewhat shaky constitutional foundations, 
its rules offer a powerful counterexample against the Borkian fear that 
unelected judges will wreak havoc on the political process.  This basic 
constitutional principle calls for economic competition across state borders 
and thus creates a common market within the United States that has 
proved a powerful engine for economic growth and social mobility.  The 
principle, however, does not take the form of a universal prohibition 
against regulation.  Rather, its central tenet calls for nondiscrimination that 
prevents local favoritism, subject to a police power exception, tightly 
watched, to allow the exclusion of noxious substances from the state.6  
Wholly apart from the textual objections to the doctrine, its detractors 
have been unable to point to any social or economic abuse that stems 
from its faithful enforcement.  Quite the contrary, the doctrine has 
generated enormous social gains by helping to forge a strong domestic 
common market. 
The legal position with the property rights so dear to Siegan’s heart is 
today quite different, for now the rational basis test allows a latitude for 
political maneuvering that is unthinkable in areas to which closer 
 
 5. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 159–61 (2003) (upholding the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), heavily regulating federal elections, against 
First Amendment challenges). 
 6. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137–38 (1986). 
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constitutional scrutiny has been applied.  The point of the remainder of 
this essay is to explain the perfect storm that arises when these elements 
are taken in confluence in connection with state and local takings, 
ostensibly for public use.  Just what are these elements?  This list 
contains five that matter: strong zoning laws; the willingness to allow 
exactions as a condition for local approvals; procedural standards that 
are too rigid or too weak; systematic undercompensation for property 
taken; and, lastly, large state subsidies.  This list is not in random order.  
The first two items discourage private development.  The third will in 
some contexts discourage private development, but in others the expedited 
procedures will encourage the use of the eminent domain power.  The 
last two practices unambiguously encourage expanded development.  
Before looking at some recent public use cases, here is how the drama 
unfolds. 
II.  ELEMENTS OF THE PERFECT STORM   
A.  Restrictive Zoning Requirements   
The first factor that expands government use of its condemnation 
power is the restrictive zoning regulations that are imposed widely 
throughout the United States.  The political dynamics of zoning are hard 
to capture in a few sentences, for the practices of zoning can vary widely 
across communities.  Some communities go out of their way to make it 
easy for developers, while others throw every obstacle in their path.  In 
all settings, takings for public use vary inversely to the intrusiveness of 
the state regulation.  Where the state allows private developers to 
assemble parcels and build, they have little need to rely on the eminent 
domain power.  Where the obstacles abound, inside deals are more likely 
to occur.  These judgments about the extent of state regulation do not 
carry with them the implication that all types of zoning are illegitimate 
regardless of their rationale or effect.  But sensible zoning ordinances, 
such as some sign, setback, or height ordinances, which increase the 
value of property, are rarely impediments to development.  More 
aggressive zoning will typically impose severe land use restrictions and 
is effectively deployed to allow established parties to exclude either 
business rivals or unwelcome residents. 
In the short run, these obstructionist tactics often pay handsome 
dividends to the winning faction.  But the entire matter is dogged by a 
persistent prisoner’s dilemma game.  Each person counts himself victorious 
to the extent that he is able to prevent some new home or business from 
being built next door, hence the NIMBY motto “not in my back yard.”  
But for each time one small faction gains a local victory, others in the 
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community may suffer from a global defeat.  The political dynamic that 
allows immediate neighbors to block in one backyard invites blockades 
in all backyards, either simultaneously or successively.  The result is an 
overall level of development that is lower than many local citizens 
would want, coupled with a gradual depreciation of the tax base and 
infrastructure on which local communities depend.  After several new 
entrants suffer bruising defeats in a local neighborhood, the fighting 
stops, as astute developers and businesspeople move to the town next 
door which has not been burdened with these policies. 
There is an inner economic logic at work here.  The Tiebout hypothesis 
that explains how local governments operate in competition with each 
other—even as they maintain local monopolies over some aspects of 
their activities—plays itself out.7  The systematic decline then attracts 
notice, but at this point, outside capital is reluctant to enter the community 
unless and until it receives some assurance that it will not be met with 
protracted resistance.  And how is this done?  By having the municipality 
condemn land for transfer so that the program is more or less prearranged in 
ways that sharply reduce the developer’s risk.  To be sure, this maneuvering 
comes at a political price because it is always easier to keep outsiders—
who lack the vote and local ties—out than it is to force insiders—who 
have the vote and some local ties—to surrender their property.  But there 
are no absolutes here, so that sometimes the insider groups that support 
the developer are able to run roughshod over the particular landowners 
who stand to lose their homes.  The administrative state does not follow 
a model of strong property rights and develops procedures to match, 
both on the public use and the zoning side of the issue. 
B.  Land Use Exactions   
The second element is the frequent use of exactions as a condition for 
allowing new development in the local community.  The usual game 
works like this: A permit to build frequently increases the value of the 
affected land by huge margins.  The local government treats this private 
gain as a form of state largess because it knows that under today’s 
capacious definition of the police power, it can impose virtually any 
restriction on land use so long as it does not claim a possessory 
interest—for example, a public easement over property—that triggers a 
 
 7. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. 
POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
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higher standard of judicial review.8  Hence, it is, in general, fair game 
today to impose special charges that make the new developer pay a 
disproportionate contribution to local road repairs, subway renovations, 
schools, or cultural activities.  The local government knows that it cannot 
overstep all bounds but, at the same time, it speculates that the large 
gains to the new entrant are only inframarginal, so that they can be taxed 
away without altering the developer’s decision to go ahead with the 
project.  The net effect is to try to shift some fraction of the cost of a 
public improvement that works to the equal benefit of new and old 
residents onto the new residents.  In some cases, this strategy will work, 
but usually only after protracted negotiations and corresponding delays.  
Taken together, the relative overtaxation from the exaction, coupled with 
the additional time and expense, operate as a special tax on new 
development which is not offset by any special benefit.  The upshot is 
clear.  These commonly used exactions operate like any other tax.  They 
slow down the rate of private development, which once again increases 
the pressure to use the public condemnation power when the need for 
more development seems pressing. 
C.  Procedural Abuses   
We thus come to the third element of the perfect storm, which covers 
the relaxed standards for setting the timeframe in which land use 
decisions are made.  In this regard, it is important to understand that the 
optimum procedures will invariably take the form of an inverted u-
shaped curve.  Give too little protection, and the local government can 
engage in the arbitrary use of power.  Give too much protection, and the 
local government can use endless delays to kill off new development 
that some neighbors oppose.  The legal and constitutional ideal is to find 
some middle ground suitable in both cases.  But, here again, the rational 
basis test exerts its baleful influence in a predictable fashion.  Where the 
local government is intent on keeping the outsiders out, the amount of 
process afforded knows no clear end: Final judgments are shunned 
because they open the possible path to judicial review. 
The threat here is real.  One common characteristic of many of the 
Supreme Court cases that deal with building permits is that extra process 
becomes standard operating procedure.  A generation ago, after First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,9 there 
was some expectation that a local government that engaged in endless 
 
 8. For the complex limitations on easements, see Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831–37 (1987). 
 9. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
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delay could be forced to compensate the aggrieved landowner for any 
total loss of a property’s interim use.  But that protection offered in First 
English has turned out to be largely illusory.  Calculating the damages 
from total temporary takings is not an easy business, especially if the 
baseline is not the full use of the property in the interim, but its use value 
only under the most restrictive zoning ordinance that could have been 
imposed without incurring obligations to compensate.  All that requires 
is that there be no loss of all viable economic use.  There is not a lot of 
money in those cases if the damages in cases of temporary total takings 
are measured against the paltry returns that local governments can allow. 
The situation only gets worse in light of the procedural impediments 
that block even that limited avenue of recovery.  Chief amongst these is 
the rule which was mentioned but not material to the outcome in First 
English: the local government was allowed to impose restrictions on use 
without compensation so long as it was engaged in the “normal delays in 
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and 
the like which are not before us,” because the administrative decision 
was implemented early on in the process.10  In retrospect, this concession 
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, turned out to 
be fatal.  To be sure, the limitation sounds sensible so long as there is a 
fixed upper bound to the length of administrative review, after which 
a full compensation obligation kicks in.  Indeed, many state statutes 
provide for some maximum period during which these administrative 
reviews are supposed to be completed.11  The logic here is that all 
landowners can expect to go through some abbreviated process at some 
time, such that the short dispensation has no disparate impact over time 
and reduces the administrative costs of running the compensation.12  
Stated otherwise, from the ex ante perspective, the imposition of a short 
grace period for government delays is likely to increase the value of all 
properties subject to the rule.  Indeed, this desirable pattern was the 
source of Rehnquist’s caution about “normal delays.”  But the term 
normal proved to carry no independent normative weight.  Instead, the 
 
 10. Id. at 321. 
 11. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 353–54 (2002); see also, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65858 (Deering 1987 & 
Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-90(b) (West 1991) (providing examples of state 
laws that limit the duration of administrative review). 
 12. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just 
Compensation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1081, 1099 (1999). 
EPSTEIN.FINAL.DOC 10/10/2008  3:27:37 PM 
 
618 
period of time allowable for administrative review counted as normal if it 
were routinely given.  The local governments sensed that the situation 
extended their normal review processes and thus effectively blunted the 
operation of the First English boomlet.  The net effect is that flexible 
procedures are routinely available to slow matters down. 
To add insult to injury, it has become equally clear that the Supreme 
Court has taken the position that federal courts should not be allowed 
open to just compensation claims brought against the states under 
Section 1983, which speaks—or better, spoke—about the ability to gain 
entry into federal court for the vindication of any federal constitutional 
right that had been denied under color of state law.  In Patsy v. Board of 
Regents,  which involved civil rights claims for racial discrimination, the 
distrust of state governments led the Supreme Court to hold that Patsy 
did not have to exhaust her administrative remedies in state court in 
order to press her constitutional claim in federal district court.13  They 
could just start in federal court and bypass the state system.  But Patsy 
was distinguished away in Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank14 on frivolous grounds that show once 
again why property rights are second-class citizens in the current 
constitutional hierarchy.  Patsy had held that no aggrieved party had to 
participate in any administrative process at all.  As such, there was no 
need for that party either to exhaust the many procedural steps that were 
available or bear the time and delay of having an administrative decision 
adverse to interest.  Because there was no need to get into the administrative 
system, there was no need to worry about the impact of any final 
decision within that system.  But in Williamson, Patsy was reinterpreted 
to say that it was concerned only with exhaustion and not with 
administrative finality, even though Patsy required neither.15  The upshot 
was that, after Williamson, a landowner could not escape the administrative 
process even after an application for general approval under a local plan 
was denied, but was instead forced to seek a variance, which is rarely 
granted, and then only after the passage of time has given rise to a 
change in local circumstances that was not contemplated when the plan 
was first put into effect.  The imposition of the finality requirement in 
Williamson thus knocked out the direct access to federal court and mired 
individual applicants in the state procedural web. 
Williamson does not stand alone.  Since that time, further procedural 
barriers have limited the ability of landowners to bring takings claims in 
 
 13. 457 U.S. 496, 502–03, 516 (1982). 
 14. 473 U.S. 172, 192–93 (1985). 
 15. Id. 
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federal court,16 or to keep them there even if they obtain initial jurisdiction, 
given the application of the various abstention doctrines.17  The details 
of these various rules need not be discussed here.  The one point that 
shines through is that state and local land use planning commissions can 
bottle up takings claims indefinitely in administrative maneuvers and 
keep them before sympathetic local courts until a final decision is made, 
if one is made at all.  Twenty-year cycles are not uncommon in takings 
cases under the current procedural rules,18 which assume that delay does 
not constitute a loss because there is always a chance that the 
landowner’s claim will succeed at the administrative level.  Imagine 
how the world of free speech would look if prior restraints on 
publication were judged by the same lax standards. 
The procedural situation often takes on a different complexion, 
however, when powerful government interests wish to use the eminent 
domain power to take land for public use.  Once state or local governments, 
or both, back a project, then the risk is that administrative processes will 
move at warp speed.  There is a chance that major actions will be passed 
without any legislative or administrative review at all, or that various 
requirements for requests for proposals or competitive bids will be 
waived in favor of a preferred suitor.  These decisions may be challenged in 
court, but at this point, the presumption in favor of the propriety of 
government action can toss any procedural constraints to one side.  
There is no reason to think that this practice should universally occur, 
given that the operative go-aheads could easily be made in forums that 
do not allow local opposition to galvanize.  But the risk is surely here.  
And just as too much political protection is unwanted, so too is too little. 
D.  Systematic Undercompensation   
The next spur to aggressive use of the eminent domain power comes 
from the systematic undercompensation that is paid out in all public 
takings cases.  In principle, the correct standard for compensation derives 
from the overall design of the Takings Clause.  The key point here is that 
 
 16. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 
323, 342–47 (2005). 
 17. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 409–10 (9th Cir. 
1996) (applying Pullman abstention). 
 18. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 
687, 695–96 (1999) (resulting in a denial of five successive proposals for development of 
projects for 344, 264, 224, and finally 190 units, all of which were eventually rejected). 
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the genius of the Clause rests in its charting a middle track between two 
unacceptable extremes.  The first extreme allows the state to take property 
only with the consent of its owner, that is, by purchase.  The evident risk 
in many key land assembly cases is that individual landowners will hold 
out for a small fortune and thus shipwreck public projects that in all 
likelihood would work social improvements.  That holdout risk could be 
overcome by simply allowing the state to take any land that it wishes for 
public projects, without just compensation. 
In principle, states that have perfect knowledge and pure motivations 
should only take property when the gain from placing the property in 
public hands is greater than the losses sustained by the former private 
owners.19  Compensation would be a mere detail because the virtuous 
and knowledgeable state would only take on desirable projects, whose 
cumulative impact would create across-the-board benefits.  From the ex 
ante position, all citizens would benefit from a set of rules that dispensed 
with the pesky administrative costs needed to value the property so 
taken.  But of course, Madison’s concern with faction in Federalist Ten 
was only the first of many astute observations about the fragility of these 
twin assumptions.  Governments are often ignorant of the true facts, and 
they respond to political pressure. 
The combination of these two dangers means that in all cases, the 
power of the state to take should be qualified by its obligation to 
compensate owners for the losses that they sustain.  Now the state still 
has a powerful option, but one that can be exercised only on payment.  
That payment thus disciplines government behavior by forcing taxpayers 
to make honest evaluations of whether they receive from acquiring 
public ownership a benefit commensurate with the costs that they 
impose—the very thing that does not happen when exactions are freely 
allowed.  But this system of compensation will work only on one 
condition: The price set for government compensation has to be 
calibrated so as to leave the individual citizen at least as well off after 
the eminent domain power has been exercised as he or she was before.  
The current rules fail to do this in systematic ways.  They offer no 
compensation for the loss of subjective value, which can be quite high 
for properties that are not for sale.  They offer no compensation for the 
legal and appraisal fees needed to challenge a condemnation.  They offer 
no moving expenses or compensation for loss of goodwill.  These 
shortcomings are systematic and likely large.  There are, to my knowledge, 
no systematic errors that cut in the opposite direction, to offset the 
undercompensation risk. 
 
 19. For an elaboration, see Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics 
of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 51–53 (1992). 
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The net effect is that the low just compensation rule reduces the costs 
to the government of exercising its takings power.  Even if nothing were 
done to prop up the current flaccid structure of the Public Use Clause, 
tighter and more accurate rules on just compensation would raise the 
price for the use of the eminent domain power and thus lower the 
likelihood of its occurrence.  But, as matters stand, the weak rules on just 
compensation offer an implicit subsidy which the state can capitalize on 
whenever it exercises its eminent domain powers.  As with all subsidies, 
the lax compensation rules stimulate too much taking for public use. 
E.  State Subsidies for Development Programs   
The last critical weakness in our basic constitutional structure is that it 
places relatively few constraints on the ability of the state to create 
cross-subsidies among its members.  The efforts to restrain various uses 
of public resources that help A and hurt B are difficult, because there is 
no obvious textual home for the rules.  The Constitution is much more 
explicit in the way in which it limits the power of the state to regulate 
private property than it is with any limitations that it imposes on state 
largess with, of course, other people’s money.  There have been a number 
of judicial efforts to impose limitations on state power to transfer public 
land, for example, to favored constituents, of which perhaps the most 
famous is Justice Field’s effort to create a public trust doctrine in Illinois 
Central Railroad v. Illinois.20  But those rules have no teeth in connection 
with shifts in land use patterns for property that remains under state 
ownership.  Diversion from one group to another is not just a routine 
management decision that carries with it no real constitutional implications.21  
The same result attaches, for the most part, to the use of cash subsidies 
to aid poor or impoverished areas—or rich and successful ones—and has 
not been curbed by any general judicial prohibition against transfers.  
These transfer payments and cross-subsidies turn out to make a 
substantial difference in the land use cases.  The current practice is to 
offer handsome subsidies to the construction of various stadia on the one 
hand, or to general programs of urban development on the other.  
Frequently, the result is that the local governments in dysfunctional 
communities receive additional funds to expand their operations, when 
 
 20. 146 U.S. 387, 453–55 (1892). 
 21. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 170–71 (2002). 
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the better approach is, if anything, to take funds away from municipal 
governments that have handled things badly.  Since taking land costs 
money under the Constitution, the infusion of these funds from outside 
the community will increase the scale of land acquisition, which will in 
turn increase the pressures on our feeble public use constraint.  Yet the 
indirect effects of these programs are nowhere taken into account in 
dealing with that issue. 
III.  THESE FACTORS AT WORK 
I have not done any systematic study of the frequency and use of the 
takings power of the United States Constitution.  But careful work 
through the Institute for Justice on the scope and frequency of taking 
land for public use does make it clear, at the very least, that this is no 
small or isolated problem.22  For our purposes, it is sufficient to take 
some recent incidents that have resulted in appellate litigation—
doubtless a small part of the overall sample—to show how these factors 
play out in a wide array of situations.  The two that are most easy to 
observe are rapid process and heavy public subsidy, which are present in 
these cases. 
A.  Kelo   
The first illustration is of course Kelo v. City of New London, which 
resulted in the condemnation of a number of houses for an ambitious real 
estate development project that never got off the ground.23  It was 
painfully clear that none of the landowners who resisted the government 
takeover was engaged in any holdout game.  As a matter of principle, 
they refused to entertain any government offers at all.  Nor did they pose 
any blockade problem because the New London Development Corporation 
had acquired title to more than enough land to complete any development 
project that it chose.  New London’s serious difficulties stemmed from 
its failure to move quickly enough with the land that was already in 
public hands, so that private developers in nearby communities filled the 
market niche by building the right kind of hotel and office space before 
anything got off the ground in New London.24  New London thus proved 
 
 22. DANA BERLINER, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE IN THE 
POST-KELO WORLD 1, 2, 6 (2006), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/floodgates- 
report.pdf. 
 23. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 24. “By July 2002, . . . Pfizer had been open in New London for a year, and it had 
found other hotels in the area . . . .  With that demand met, and with the corporate 
landscape altered, the company [informed] Corcoran Jennison that the justification for 
the hotel was ‘no longer apparent.’”  Kate Moran, Developer Says Fort Trumbull Hotel 
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itself as maladroit in condemnation as in other elements of land use 
management. 
Next, there were the evident subsidies in this case.  The State of 
Connecticut had awarded the City about $73 million in public funds to 
run its revitalization program.25  The usual justification was to prop up 
communities that had gone through bad times.26  Yet, unfortunately, the 
decision rewarded incompetence by giving the money to a city whose 
track record left nothing to admire.  Armed with the extra money—and, 
in all likelihood, fearful of having to return it unspent—New London 
embarked on an ambitious program of land acquisition and infrastructure 
improvement on a scale that would never have been attempted if all the 
needed revenue had to come from taxes on the local community.  To be 
sure, Kelo exhibited much collective deliberation, which was ultimately 
why Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, blessed its 
decision.  But judging from the output, the deliberation did not lead to an 
improvement in the collective decision. 
Kelo did not, however, give an automatic clearance to all government 
actions that claimed that a particular taking of land was for private use.  
Rather, Justice Stevens’s vision of the Clause dovetails perfectly with 
today’s dominant view of the administrative state whereby rights to 
process and public participation are said to operate as a substitute for the 
stronger property rights that limit the exercise of public power under a 
classical liberal regime of government.27  In line with this vision, Justice 
Stevens wrote that one avenue for public use challenge still remained, 
which was to show that the particular takings in question were a mere 
pretext in order to supply benefits for some private individuals: 
[T]he City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners’ land for the 
purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party.  Nor would 
the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, 
when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.28 
 
Plan Not Viable Since 2002; Project Became Unrealistic Without Pfizer Commitment, 
THE DAY (New London, Conn.), June 12, 2004, at A1. 
 25. Institute for Justice, Web Release, Prescription for an Ill-Fated Land Grab, 
Oct. 18, 2005, http://www.ij.org/private_property/connecticut/10_18_05pr.html. 
 26. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473. 
 27. For a defense, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578–82 (1984). 
 28. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477–478 (citations omitted). 
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“Pretext” within this framework has been defined to occur when an 
“ostensible public use” is employed to conceal “the desire to achieve the 
naked transfer of property from one private party to another.”29  The 
word naked is quite evocative, but is intended to cover those cases in 
which there is no—or possibly very little—public justification for the 
taking in question.  The pretext notion was not the focal point in much 
earlier takings litigation, but it looms larger now as the behavior of 
public bodies has become more aggressive in the wake of Kelo.  Here 
are some of the key recent developments that mark this important 
doctrinal shift. 
B.  Didden  
In Didden v. Village of Port Chester,30 the Village of Port Chester had 
entered into a comprehensive development plan under which it delegated 
to a private developer, Gregg Wasser, the right to approve or disapprove 
all new projects within the official redevelopment area.31  Bart Didden 
and his partner Domenick Bologna proposed to place a CVS drug store 
within the development area.  Wasser told the partners that he expected 
either an $800,000 payment or a fifty percent stake in the venture before 
he would allow it to go forward.  He then made it clear that he would 
have the Village condemn the property unless the partners yielded to the 
threat—which he carried out the day after they refused to accept his 
proposition.  Wasser then arranged for a Walgreens Drugstore to take 
over the location.  It is difficult to credit any public purpose to this particular 
maneuver.  Either way, the land in question was to be used for a drug 
store, so that the case presents no issue of additional adverse 
neighborhood effects or local externalities of the sort that new 
developments often generate.  The question here was not whether a new 
drugstore would be built, but only who would get the gains.  The case 
looks as though the condemnation was only to help Wasser—and those 
with whom he worked—maintain dominance over the site.  The 
instantaneous approval of the condemnation that he received from the 
Village only confirms the advantage that the insiders have in these 
projects.  Even though the overall urban redevelopment plan had 
received the usual public vetting, this particular choice, which in no way 
advanced the objectives of that plan, was done without any independent 
public review.  Yet the Second Circuit found that the deference under 
 
 29. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 
1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001), dismissed and remanded, 60 F. App’x 123 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 30. 173 F. App’x 931, 932 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1127 (2007). 
 31. For further commentary and factual background on the Didden decision, see 
Richard A. Epstein & Ilya Somin, A Pretextual Taking, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 8, 2007, at 27. 
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Kelo carried the day, and the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari 
in the case.  The perils of delegated authority should be evident in this 
case, even if they prompt no judicial response. 
C.  Atlantic Yards   
Right now a far larger project in New York City also is at the center of 
a public use controversy.  The Atlantic Yards project in Brooklyn, New 
York, will cover about twenty-two acres and “is planned to consist of 
sixteen towers and 8.6 million square feet of floor space, including a 
sports arena, 6,860 housing units, approximately 600,000 square feet of 
office space, and a hotel.”32  Much of the project is located over 
dilapidated structures, but the overall size of the project required the 
Empire State Development Corporation to order condemnation of a 
number of private homes within the area to keep the development 
alive.33 
Two of the key elements in the public use equation are present in this 
case.  First, the bidding process here went quite quickly.34  The developer, 
Forest City Ratner Companies (FCRC), had only one competitor, the 
Extell Corporation, which offered $150 million for a more modest 
proposal that did not require it to dispossess any residents from their 
homes.  Extell also submitted the required twenty-year profit and loss 
projections.  The FCRC bid was for only $50 million, and did not 
contain the required profit and loss projections.  Because it included the 
basketball arena, the FCRC bid did require uprooting people from their 
private homes.  The entire bidding and approval process lasted only four 
months from May 2005 to September 2005, which stands in stunning 
contrast to the twenty-year time frames that abound when real estate 
developers seek to develop a project on private lands that the public 
authorities oppose as faithful representatives to their local citizenry. 
Several features are immediately apparent from this process.  The first 
is that all stadium deals are financial losers to local governments.  To 
build these stadia therefore requires that the developer pay less money 
going in, and develop a larger area.  The differences between the Extell 
 
 32. Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 516 F.3d 
50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 33. Goldstein v. Pataki, No. 06cv5827, 2007 WL 1695573 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 
2007). 
 34. Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 257. 
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bid and the FCRC bid are consistent with this point.  The question is 
whether the truncated process in favor of FCRC would in some sense be 
found to contravene the public use requirement, to which the District 
Court answered in the negative, in a decision that the Second Circuit 
affirmed.35  To be sure, FCRC was well-connected and stands to do very 
well from the project, so it is easy to raise suspicion.  In this sense, there 
exists the type of favoritism that was not found in Kelo, where the 
developer, Corcoran Jennison, was only selected after the City of New 
London had committed itself to the condemnation of the private homes.  
But, as with all large projects of this sort, it is hard to deny that other 
people besides the developer will benefit from the offices, hotels, and 
homes that are built in the region, so that the deferential standard of Kelo 
effectively prevented the private homeowners from blocking the project. 
The key problem with subsidies is that they distort the proper margins 
for decision, which should ideally allow the taking to occur only to the 
extent that its marginal benefits exceed its marginal costs.  Yet once the 
subsidies are in play, the margins move so that the overexpansion of the 
project is a certainty, which is what happened here.  Nonetheless, the 
judicial reliance on the rational basis test precludes any systematic 
examination of the scope of the project.  It is worth recalling that in 
Kelo, the trial judge tried something of this sort when it ruled that those 
homes that stood on the periphery of the development area could not be 
taken, while those that were located toward the center could be.  In 
effect, it held that the more essential homes had to be sacrificed for 
public use while the others did not.  The Connecticut Supreme Court 
rejected the thoughtful decision of the trial judge to split the baby36—
which would have defused much of the public protest in the case—and 
the United States Supreme Court, of course, followed suit.  That path of 
events presaged the outcome in the Atlantic Yards struggle as the 
District Court concluded simply: “Once the question of the public 
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken 
for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the 
integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”37  The 
Court got out of the messy business of balancing and allowed the 
overambitious project to go forward at high private cost.  The collateral 
damage and the likely social losses are both evident. 
 
 35. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 36. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *112 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002) (allowing the differential treatment), rev’d in part, 843 A.2d 
500, 508 (Conn. 2004) (rejecting it), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 37. Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 279. 
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 D.  Soldier Field 
The Atlantic Yards case is not the only stadium case that is worthy of 
note.  Some years earlier I worked as a member of the Landmark 
Preservation Council of Illinois in an effort to derail the decision by the 
Illinois State legislature and the Mayor and City Council of Chicago to 
erect a huge addition on top of Soldier Field to allow the Chicago Bears 
to construct sky boxes from which to view home games.  Friends of the 
Parks v. Chicago Park District is not the usual type of public use case in 
that the land in question did not start in public hands.38  The property in 
question was owned by the Park District, which had already leased the 
site to the Chicago Bears.39  The question was whether this additional 
construction, which defiled a red list—or highest rated—public monument, 
could be stopped as an abuse of state power.  Since no private property 
was involved, the case did not turn on the public use language of the 
Fifth Amendment.  But it did turn on the question of whether the deal 
with the Chicago Bears ran afoul of the public trust doctrine on grounds 
that it represented a gift of public assets, collected in various forms of 
local taxes, to the Bears.40  In dealing with this case, the opponents of the 
maneuver—of whom I was one—sought to introduce evidence by the 
sports-economist Allen R. Sanderson to the effect that the tax burden 
was in the order of $600 million while the net increase in the value of 
the Bears Franchise was only $300 million.41  That evidence was, 
however, excluded on the ground that the local government had full 
discretion to decide whether or not to proceed with the plan. 
The case has all the hallmarks of bad public deals.  There were no 
hearings on the legislation that authorized the construction of the new 
project,42 which meant that there was no willingness to entertain an 
alternative, and cheaper, proposal that would have restored Soldier Field 
to its original purpose as a soccer and track stadium by raising up the 
floor, which would both have increased its size to allow for these 
activities and reduced its capacity and hence its operating costs.43  The 
 
 38. 786 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Ill. 2003). 
 39. Id. at 163. 
 40. Id. at 165. 
 41. Allen R. Sanderson, A Home for the NFL Chicago Bears: A Case Study in 
Political Economy and Power 8 (June 16, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author), available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~arsx/Bears&SoldierFieldJuly04.pdf. 
 42. Id. at 5. 
 43. Id. at 16. 
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Bears in turn would have been housed in a new domed stadium that 
could have been built near the White Sox Park to take advantage of 
shared common infrastructure at that location.44  This total deal, which 
would have provided two up-to-date venues, would have cost less than 
the renovation of Soldier Field and would not have led to the desecration 
of a national landmark. 
But, again, none of this mattered in the rational basis universe.  Here 
the Illinois Supreme Court invoked the test once again, noting that its 
earlier decision “in Lappe require[s] us to defer to the legislative 
findings announced in the Act unless the plaintiffs make a threshold 
showing that the findings are evasive and that the purpose of the 
legislation is principally to benefit private interests,” which could not be 
established in light of Soldier Field’s extensive use for sporting events.45  
In re Marriage of Lappe, on which the Court relied, upheld legislation 
that redefined support obligations to children of divorce, but had nothing 
to do with the larger political forces at work in this Soldier Field dispute.46 
This decision came as something of a disappointment because of a 
then recent decision in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority 
v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., where the local development 
authority had used its quick-take eminent domain power to condemn 
private property held by NCE, a metal recycling company, for use of 
Gateway, which ran its own race track.47  The decision involved a transfer 
of private property through an overdeferential administrative process, 
and thus was distinguishable on its facts from the current case.48  But the 
distinction is more superficial than real.  The use of public power in both 
cases worked transfers between private persons.  Even though there was 
not an outright transfer of the leased property to the Chicago Bears, the 
leasehold transaction created vested rights whose value to the team were 
far lower than their costs to the public at large.  But the unwillingness to 
scrutinize the transaction in any of its particulars meant that the case 
sailed through.  The rational basis test had claimed another victim. 
E.  Love Field   
At this point it becomes an open question of how much fight is left to 
the public use limitation.  That question might be answered in short 
order in connection with the dispute that has taken place at Love Field in 
 
 44. Id. at 15. 
 45. Friends of the Parks, 786 N.E.2d at 166–67. 
 46. 680 N.E.2d 380, 392 (Ill. 1997). 
 47. 768 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 2002). 
 48. Id. at 10. 
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the North Texas airline market.49  The problem here began in the 
aftermath of the major 1978 airline deregulation, with the passage of the 
Wright Amendment in 1979—named after House Speaker Jim Wright—
which limited flights out of Love Field.50  Only planes that flew fifty-
six or fewer passengers out of the Field could go to any point in the 
United States.  Other flights had to remain in Texas or land in one of 
four contiguous states.  The clear protectionist purpose of this statute 
was to aid the Dallas Fort Worth Airport, where American Airlines was 
the dominant carrier, in resisting competition from Southwest Airlines, 
which used Love Field, conveniently located near downtown Dallas.  
With the passage of time, the pressure on the Wright Amendment grew.  
In response thereto, American Airlines, Southwest, the Dallas Fort 
Worth Airport, and the two cities of Dallas and Fort Worth entered into a 
comprehensive agreement under which all parties would work toward 
the repeal of the Wright Amendment by 2014, but with this catch: The 
twelve gates at Love Field that were not owned by Southwest would be 
condemned by the Airport authority and destroyed at the earliest 
possible moment.51  Owing to the obvious antitrust risk of this market 
division, the agreement was expressly conditioned on approval from the 
United States Congress, which duly came in 2006.52 
The initial round of litigation in this case challenged the agreement 
under the antitrust laws.  Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater held that the antitrust 
conspiracy was obvious from the face of the agreement but that it was 
entitled to complete protection under the various antitrust immunities of 
the so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine, with respect to the various 
petitioning doctrines,53 and because the parties were compelled to order 
the takings under the Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006,54 which 
they were so instrumental in procuring.55  For our purposes, we can 
assume that these findings are incontestable, so the question then arises 
whether there is a public use challenge to the taking and destruction of 
the gates in question.  The pretext exception that was announced by 
Justice Stevens seems very much at play.  The contractual agreement has 
 
 49. For all the details, see Love Terminal Partners v. City of Dallas, 527 F. Supp. 
2d 538, 543–47 (N.D. Tex. 2007). 
 50. Id. at 544. 
 51. Id. at 545. 
 52. Id. at 547. 
 53. Id. at 550–52. 
 54. Id. at 558–60. 
 55. Id. at 545–47. 
EPSTEIN.FINAL.DOC 10/10/2008  3:27:37 PM 
 
630 
two named private parties, American Airlines and Southwest.  The 
antitrust judgment suggests that there is a prior judicial finding that the 
third party effects of this agreement are negative, so that it is hard to 
argue, with a straight face, that this agreement works for the benefit of 
the public at large.  But stranger things have happened.  It is, in principle, 
possible for any court to argue that there are other benefits that derive 
from this peaceful resolution of a long-simmering dispute.  And there are 
incredible claims that cutting out the competitors is appropriate to 
control air traffic and curb pollution.  But there is no explanation why 
the entire cutback has to benefit the insiders at the expense of everyone 
else.  All that can be said at this time is that if this particular agreement 
is said to pass the public use test in the face of its per se antitrust 
violation, then Justice Stevens’s exception is a true dead letter.  We do 
not know whether this line of argument will be pursued or, if so, whether 
it will prevail.  But we do know that each successive relaxation of a 
constitutional constraint will induce at least some government agencies 
to take advantage of it. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: THE ORIGINALIST QUESTION 
This review of the various cases has profound implications for how we 
think about constitutional law.  Bernie Siegan was one of the earlier 
defenders of the originalist approach to constitutional law, which sought 
to extract the meaning of the text as it was understood at the time of the 
founding as the sole, or at least dominant, guide to constitutional 
interpretation.  That originalist view does not condemn us to a static 
view of the Constitution in the face of major social and technical change.  
For example, the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the 
several states is not limited to stagecoaches and sailboats.  It covers all 
modern technologies that engage in journeys that cross state lines.  Yet 
by the same token, if a purely intrastate horseback ride were outside the 
scope of federal power in 1787, then the corresponding car ride should 
be outside its scope today, even though the law cuts very much in the 
opposite direction. 
The question then arises as to how this approach applies to both the 
takings law with its public use requirement as well as other aspects of 
the protection of private property and economic liberties.  On these 
questions, all we know from the text is that its preferred objects of 
protection include private property and ordinary contractual liberties.  
There is not a trace of positive rights to jobs, housing, health care, or 
anything else.  But by the same token, the developed law in these areas 
was quite weak.  The takings jurisprudence, for example, had not yet 
confronted any systematic cases where property was not taken into 
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possession by government agents, who chose to pass restrictions on its use 
and disposition.  I have argued that the line between these two classes of 
takings is made of gossamer on the ground of simple structural 
analogies.  What sense does it make to say that someone may exclude 
the government from land that he is not allowed to enter, use, or sell?  
But others, notably William Treanor in this Conference, have taken the 
opposite position.56  Similarly, the early cases give no indication of the 
extent to which the police power could limit the exercise of liberty and 
property, as that issue only came to the fore toward the end of the 
Marshall Court.57  It would be nice if we could find some authoritative 
texts on these key doctrines, but the historical record is noticeably 
reticent in connection with both the Takings Clause and the Contracts 
Clause, for example. 
In the face of this gap, how then does an originalist proceed?  I think 
that there is only one answer.  The overall structure of the Constitution is 
one that concentrates on limited federal powers and the protection of 
individual rights to property and contracts.  We know that these rights 
are in no sense absolute.  Property can be taken with just compensation, 
and is subject to taxation, so the challenge is in how we find the 
appropriate limitations.  On that question, the one wrong guide is surely 
the rational basis test, which affords every presumption in favor of the 
use of state power, when any theory of limited government has to 
reverse the presumption to the state to give some reason why it must act.  
There are many such reasons, including the prevention of fraud and 
violence, the control of monopoly, the provision of infrastructure, and 
the protection of minors and other incompetents.  And it is striking that 
whenever the United States Supreme Court announces anything stronger 
than a rational basis test, it always gravitates to rules that are limited to 
these ends, and which choose means that have a fair likelihood of 
 
 56. William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633 (2008).  Note 
that even the current law deviates from that position by at least allowing compensation in 
some regulatory takings cases.  The hard question is why, once that barrier is necessarily 
crossed, we no longer apply the doctrine to lesser regulations which have huge negative 
impacts on value.  In dealing with physical occupations, the size of the invasion determines 
the amount of compensation owed.  Why not here? 
 57. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 
(1829) (reconciling local police power with federal commerce power); Brown v. 
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 423, 428 (1827) (dealing with power of state 
regulation of imports and importers). 
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achieving them.58  So at this point the originalist approach has a direct 
tie to the political theory that animated the Constitution.  That theory 
may not require all of the results that I have urged in this essay and on 
other occasions.  But it narrows the range of possibilities down far below 
what the current courts are routinely willing to tolerate in dealing with 
both private property and the liberty to enter into voluntary agreements.  
Bernie Siegan was the first modern scholar to see the dangers in this 
approach.  And now our great homage to him is to recognize that on the 
one point that really matters, he was spot on. 
 
 
 58. For my defense of this approach, see Richard A. Epstein, The “Necessary” 
History of Property and Liberty, 6 CHAPMAN L. REV. 1, 27–29 (2003). 
